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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GLEN H. WHITEHOUSE,
Petitioner/Appellant,
Case No. 20669

vs.
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, CHIEF,
DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
STATE OF UTAH,
Defendant/Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issue on appeal is whether or not a driver having
been arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol after
having once refused to take the chemical test can recant his
refusal within a reasonable time.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For

purposes

of

this

expedited

appeal, appellant,

will not contest that the South Salt Lake police officer had
probable

cause to place him under arrest for violation of

§41-6-44 U.C.A. as amended

(DUI).

He was arrested in South

Salt Lake August 22, 1984 (T. 2) at 10:10 p.m. (T. 16). After
certain field tests he was transported to the South Salt Lake
Police Station where a breath test was requested.

For

purposes

of

this

appeal

appellant

does

not

contest the adequacy of the warning by the arresting officer
of

the

possible

consequences

for

refusing

to submit

to a

chemical test of the officer's choosing.
By way of factual background the following evidence
is directed to the Court's attention.
(T. 12, lines 2-7)
A:

Then I believe Sgt. Gillette asked him
again, "You're not going to take the test?"
And he said, "No, I am not."
And Sgt. Gillette made some comment about,
"Thanks for wasting my time," and shut the
machine down and left the office.
(T. 12, lines 8-22)

Q:

Now, Officer, did Mr. Whitehouse ever make
any further request that the test be
readmmistered to nim?

A:

Yes, sir, he did.

Q:

Could you tell us the time element there
and who was present and what was said?

A:

The only two present were myself and Mr.
Whitehouse. It was approximately three to
five minutes after Sgt. Gillette left that
Mr. Whitehouse expressed his desire to
take the test. I refused to allow him and
I believe I explained that that would
involve Sgt. Gillette coming back and
turning on the machine and going through
the same processes again. And that he had
refused once, and I believe statutorily
that was mentioned.
(T. 16, lines 3-21)

Q:

Okay. You started preparing the report at
10:25 at, where, the police station?

-2-

Yes, sir.
So that puts
10:30?

Gillette

at

arrived

about

Approximately, yes, sir.
And Gillette is
before he leaves?

there

about

how

long

Probably ten minutes.
And within four minutes after Gillette
leaves the driver says, "i will take the
test"?
Yes, sir.
Gillette is still on duty?
Yes, sir.
Any other officers on duty?
Yes, sir.
That are certified to operate the machine?
I believe Officer Davis, who assisted me
in the arrest, but I am not sure of that.
(T. 17, lines 2-25)
I
believe
you
testified
in
another
proceeding on the way to the jail he again
wanted to take the test?
Yes, sir, I believe he did at that point.
And by the time you arrived at the Salt
Lake County Jail, did you offer him the
test, wnich
—
at
the
machine
located
there?
No, sir.
And so twice, once with Gillette on duty
within three or four minutes, on the way
to the Salt Lake County Jail, he again

-3-

wanted to take the test, and you did not
offer him a test again; is that correct?
A:

That's correct.

Q:

Now, going to the last page of your
report, it's signed by Gary Gillette, your
sergeant; is that correct?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

That signing is at 2330, which is 11:30?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

That would be approximately an hour and
ten minutes after he was stopped?

A:

Yes, sir.
(T. 18, lines 12-16)

Q:

And this is 2320 after you returned to
Salt Lake an hour and 20 minutes after you
completed tne stop, completed your report
sworn to it before Gillette, who is a
notary public?

A:

Yes, sir.

For

purposes

of

this

brief

appellant

not

having

raised the issue at the lower court does not either directly
or Dy inference question tne validity of the notarization of
the arresting officer's affidavit by a sergeant of the same
police agency.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant

submits

that

his

subsequent

agreeing

to

take the breath test within a reasonable time after his arrest
and without evidence of undue delay effecting the validity of
the test results or hardships on the police, a prior refusal
can be withdrawn.
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ARGUMENT
The brief

transcript

reveals no facts

in dispute.

The question of withdrawing a refusal has been dealt with by
many courts.

The most cited case for this proposition is Lund

v. Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 552 (N.D. 1974).
arrested
advised

at
of

8:30
the

p.m. following
repercussions

of

In that case Lund was

an accident.
refusing

to

He was duly
submit

to a

chemical test after his refusal to submit to the requested
test.

At 9:30 p.m. Lund requested the opportunity to submit

to a chemical test which was denied by the arresting officer.
In sustaining the district court's reversal of the actions of
the State Highway Commissioner, the Supreme

Court of North

Dakota stated as follows:
[6-9] The purpose of Chapter 39-20, N.D.C.C.,
the Implied Consent Lawf is to eliminate the
drunken driver from the highways by requiring
drivers suspected of operating motor vehicles
while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor to submit to a chemical test to
determine
the alcoholic
content
of their
blood. Since the accuracy of a chemical test
under Cnapter 39-20 does not depend upon its
being administered immediately after an arrest,
accident or other event, and thus a delay for a
reasonable period of time while an arrested
person considers or reconsiders a decision
whether or not to submit to a chemical test
will
not
frustrate
the
object
of
the
Legislature in enacting Chapter 39-20, we hold
that where, as here, one who is arrested for
driving under the influence of intoxicating
liquor first refuses to submit to a chemical
test to determine the alcoholic content of his
blood and later changes his mind and requests a
chemical blood test, the subsequent consent to
take the test cures the prior first refusal
when the request to take the test is made

-5-

within a reasonable time after the prior first
refusal; when such a test administered upon the
subsequent consent would still be accurate;
when testing equipment or facilities are still
readily available; when honoring a request for
a test, following a prior first refusal, will
result in no substantial inconvenience or
expense to the police; and when the individual
requesting the test has been m police custody
and under observation for the whole time since
his arrest. At 557.
Support for this proposition was noted in R. Donigan, Chemical
Tests and the Law (2d ed. 1966):
Thus, from the known length of elapsed time
between the taking of the specimen for analysis
and the event in issue, the known rate of
average elimination of blood alcohol in the
average person, and the result of the chemical
test in the particular case, experts in this
field
can
arrive
by
the
process
of
extrapolation at a fairly reasonable estimate
of the percentage of blood alcohol in the
average person at the time of a certain event
if he had the quantity of alcohol in his blood
as shown by the chemical test in the case on
trial.
The

same

reasoning

was codified

in §41-6-44.5(2) .

Other cases in accord are Zahtila v. Motor Vehicle Division,
560 P.2d 847 (Colo. App. 1977).

In that case Zahtila refused

•*• (2) If the chemical test was taken within two
hours of the alleged driving or actual physical control, the
blood alcohol level of the person at the time of the alleged
driving or actual physical control shall be presumed to be not
less than the level of the alcohol determined to be in the
blood by the chemical test.

-6-

a

blood

test

and

twenty-five

(25)

minutes

reconsidered his decision and requested a test.

afterwards
The Colorado

Supreme Court stated as follows:
While a motorist has no right under the statute
to confer with counsel prior to deciding
whether he will consent to a test, Calvert v.
Motor Vehicle Division, supra, where, as here,
he is permitted to do so, tnereafter consents
to the test, and the officer is available to
see that the test is administered, the primary
purpose of the statute is fulfilled unless the
delay will materially affect the result of the
test. At 849.
The Hawaii Supreme Court in State v. Moore, 614 P. 2d
931 (Hawaii 1980) adopting this rule also citing Zahtila and
Hjelie, supra, stated:
We adopt the criteria of the North Dakota
Supreme Court. We hold that unless a delay
would materially affect the test results or
prove substantially inconvenient to administer,
a subsequent consent may cure a prior refusal
to be tested. At 935.
In Gaunt

v. Motor

Vehicle

Division,

666 P.2d

524

(Ariz.App. 1983) adopting the Zahtila, Moore and Hjelie and
recognizing

that

tnere is a majority

and minority position

stated as follows:
We find the so-called miniority rule to be
"more logical and fair." (citation omitted)
Although
an
absolute
rule
preventing
a
subsequent consent after an initial refusal has
the advantage of granting unmistakable clarity
to the defendant's obligation under the implied
consent , law, it could lead to unnecessarily
harsh and self-defeating results.
It is not
hard
to
imagine
circumstances
where
the
defendant, soon after declining to take the
breath test, has second thoughts. If the test
results would remain valid, and if no material
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inconvenience is caused to the police, we fail
to see the harm in permitting the defendant to
subsequently consent to take the test.
The breath test results could be an
essential part of the state's case against the
arrested motorist
(or part
of
motorist's
defense).
By approving a flexible rule we
believe that this important evidence will be
more frequently available and therefore the
prophylactic purpose of the implied consent law
will be achieved. At 527.
See also Sedlacek v. Pearson, 284 N.W.2d 556 (Nebraska 1979).
In view of South Dakota v. Neville, 459 US 553, 74
L.Ed.2d

748, 103 S.Ct.

916, and

2
amended , appellant's refusal

§41-6-44.10(8)

U.C.A.

as

to submit to a chemical test

is admissible in any civil or criminal trial.
We are dealing with a civil standard for forfeiture
of driver's privileges.
a driver

Therefore in applying for a license,

impliedly agrees to submit

to a chemical test if

arrested for driving under the influence.

2

He thereby consents

(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit
to a chemical test or tests under the provisions of this
section, evidence of refusal shall be admissible in any civil
or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged
to have oeen committed while the person was driving or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and
any drug.
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to a validly obtained test result be used against him in a
criminal proceeding, or he permits evidence of refusal to be
introduced

for what evidentiary

inferences may exist.

constitutes a forfeiture of one of two rights.

This

In view of the

forfeiture of a right, a reasonable analogy to that forfeiture
can

be

found

liquidated

in

damage

standard
clauses.

Uniform

Real

Estate

Contract

This Court has repeatedly held

since Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Ut. 468, 243 P.2d
that it disfavors forfeitures.

446 (1952)

It is undisputed law that a

drivers license is a "protectable property interest".

Mackey

v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 61 L.Ed.2d 321, 99 S.Ct. 2612 at 329.
Therefore if forfeitures of money are treated in disfavor it
would

be only reasonable to apply a more fair standard in

determining if a person has in fact refused to submit to a
chemical test.
CONCLUSION
Since

appellant

within

minutes

of

his

refusal

to

submit to a chemical test requested the test be given while a
test was still available, and again requested
given while

the test be

in route to the Salt Lake County Jail where a

machine was available, the refusal to provide him with an
©pportunity to submit to (at least) a breathilizer test was
unreasonable.

Appellant

submits

that

the

action

of

the

respondent - in revoking his driving privileges when the entire
period from first viewing appellant (10:10 p.m.), transporting

-9-

him to the South Salt Lake Police Station, thereafter to the
Salt Lake County Jail for booking, and the arresting officer
returning
(Exhibit

to

his

station

1) and having

completing

his

DUI

the same approved

and

report

form

notarized at

11:30 p.m. by the same officer who came to the station to
administer
acts.

the

test

constitutes

arbitrary

and

capricious

The District Court should be reversed and appellant's

license reinstated.
Respectfully

submitted

this J 2 ^ 2

da

¥

of

(£ ts^iSL^j

1985.
McRAE & DeLAND

ROBERT M. McRAE
Attorney for Appellant
209 East 100 Nortn
Vernal, Utah 84078
(801) 789-1666
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I

do

hereby

certify

that

I

caused

to

be

hand-

delivered four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief
of Appellant to Bruce M. Hale, Assistant Attorney General, 236
State

Capitol

Building,

this "?- o day of

Salt

U**A

Lake
_j

-10-

1985.

City,

Utah

84114

on

DAVID L. WILKINSON (#3472)
Attorney General
BRUCE M. HALE (#1298)
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General
236 S t a t e C a p i t o l
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114
Telephone:
533-7606
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GLEN H. WHITEHOUSE,
Petitioner,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

FRED C. SCHNENDIMAN, Chief,
Driver License Services,
Department of Public Safety,
State of Utah,

Case No. C84-6217

Respondent*

The above-entitled matter having come before the
Court, being regularly scheduled for trial de novo on February
27, 19 85, the parties being represented by counsel and the
arresting officer being present, and the parties having made
proffers of proof and stipulations and being accepted by the
Court and the-Court being apprised in the premises, the Court
makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1)

The testimony preponderates that the officer had

cause to and did arrest the petitioner.

2)

The p e t i t i o n e r was p r o p e r l y r e q u e s t e d t o t a k e a

c h e m i c a l t e s t , p u r s u a n t t o Utah Code Ann. § 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 1 0

(1953)

a s amended f and warned of t h e consequences i f t h e r e was a
r e f u s a l and t h e machine was shut down.
3)

T h a t p e t i t i o n e r u n d e r s t o o d he would l o s e h i s

d r i v i n g p r i v i l e g e f o r one y e a r , and d i d n o t immediately

after

refusing request the t e s t .
The C o u r t , having made t h e f o r e g o i n g F i n d i n g s of
F a c t , now makes i t s :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1)

P u r s u a n t t o Utah Code Ann. § 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 1 0

amended, and a l l e l e m e n t s t h e r e o f b e i n g complied w i t h ,

(1953)

as

the

p e t i t i o n e r h a v i n g r e f u s e d t o submit t o a chemical t e s t ,

the

p e t i t i o n s h o u l d be d e n i e d .
2)

The c i r c u m s t a n c e and u n c o n t r a d i c t e d

testimony

show t h a t p e t i t i o n e r d i d n o t make an "immediate" r e q u e s t
the o f f i c e r ' s

for

test.
ORDER

The C o u r t having made t h e f o r e g o i n g F i n d i n g s of Fact
and C o n c l u s i o n s of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, ORDERED AND DECREED t h a t
1)

The p e t i t i o n i s

denied.

2)

The p e t i t i o n e e s d r i v i n g p r i v i l e g e s be revoked

p u r s u a n t t o Utah Code Ann. § 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 1 0

(1953) a s amended.

DATED this _I_^L_L_ day of

1 I Si ,r{

1985.

HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO
District Court Judge

MAILING GERTIFIC&IS
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was
mailed, first class, postage prepaid, to the following on this
JZL2J?

&rv of March, 1SE5:
Robert K. KcRae
Attorney at Lav7
209 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 8407 8

uii\m(Makir^

TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

41-6-44.10

41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test results in actions for driving under
the influence or with a prohibited blood alcohol content — Weight. (1) In any
action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person was driving
or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or
with a blood alcohol content ef .10% or greater statutorily prohibited, the results
of a chemical test or tests as authorized in section 41-6-44.10 shall be admissible
as evidence.
(2) If the chemical test was taken within two hours of the alleged driving or
actual physical control, the blood alcohol level of the person at the time of the
alleged driving or actual physical control shall be presumed to be not less than
the level of the alcohol determined to be in the blood by the chemical test.
(3) If the chemical test was taken more than two hours after the alleged driving
or actual physical control, the test result shall be admissible as evidence of the
person's blood alcohol level at the time of the alleged driving or actual physical
control, but the trier of fact shall determine what weight shall be given to the
result of the test.
(4) The foregoing provisions of this section shall not be construed fts limiting
the consideration or application by the trier ef faet ef the presumptions set forth
fa section 41-6-44, nor shall they prevent a court from receiving otherwise admissible evidence as to a defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of the alleged driving or actual physical control.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.5, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 243, § 3; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 15.

41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys authorized to prosecute for driving while
license suspended or revoked. Alleged violations of section 41-2-28, which consist
of the j i - c i Jnvihg while, his opors'-i^ or chauffeur's license is suspended or
revol'ul -oi r- vloktion of ^cjion 41-0-44, a local ordinance which complies with
the requirements of section 41-6-43, section 41-6-44.10, section 76-5-207, or a criminal prcliihiii.:. iiiii the person was charged with violating as a result of a plea
bargain ifL;; L- vm^ ben. criminally charged wiih violating one of more of those
sc-ctionr .T . "• *•• •.. .• *-.. L^ y )>*. j r. v-r-iiv: b\ ati^rneys of cities and towns as well
as by pU'.;'j' -ituii. who aie empowered elsewhere in this code to prosecute those
alleged violations.
attorneys of cities and towns to prosecute
those alleged violations.
This act enacts section 41-G-44.S. Utah
Code Annotated 1953. - Laws 1983, eh. 102.

History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.8, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 102, §1.
Title of Act.
An art relating to prosecution of alleged
violations of section 41-2-28, empowering city

41-6-44.10, Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug — Refusal
to allow — Warning, report, revocation of license — Court action on revocation — Person incapable of refusal — Results of test available — Who may
give test — Evidence, fa) £1) Any person oftesaliftg a motor vehicle in this state
shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath,
blood, or urine for the purpose of determining whether he was driving or in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily
prohibited, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of
alcohol and any drug as detailed in section 41-6-44, provided thtrt s«eh so long as
the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace officer having
gmmmdM'afa&G&i&e stteh that person to have been driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited,
or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and

67

41-6-44.10

MOTOR VEHICLES

any drug as detailed in section 41-6-44. A peace officer shall determine which of
the aforesaid tests shaTTbe administered.
No person; who has been requested pursuant to under this section to submit to
a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, shall have the right to select
the test or tests to be administered. The failure or inability of a peace officer to
arrange for any specific test shall is not be a defense with regard to taking a test
requested by a peace officer ftor an? it shall not be a defense in any criminal, civil
or administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the
requested test or tests.
(b) (2) If saeh the person has been placed under aiyaast and has thereafter been
i^juestgd by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests
provided for in subsection (a) (1} of this section and »af4^es to submit to sueh the
chemical test or tests, s«eh the person sfea^te^ww'Wtgtl by a peace officer requesting
the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation
of his license to operate a motor vehicle. Following this warning, unless s«eh the
person immediately requests the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer
be administered, no test shall be given and a peace officer shall submit a £wgrn
•GP-Stfi within five days after the date of the arrest, that he had grounds to believe
the arrested person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited or while under
the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug as
detailed in section 41-6-44 and that the person had refused to submit to a chemical
test or tests as set forth in subsection ftr) (Y) of this section. Within 2G-days after
receiving a sworn report from a peace officer to the effect that mreh the person
has refused a chemical iezt or tests the department shall notify streh the person
of a hearing l\iwh the c^,: rnnent. If ai r~ ^ t V t he? :?-g the department determines that the person v^s granted the ri^Li to submit to a chemical test or tests
and refused to submit to s-&eh the test or tests, or if st*eh the person fails to appear
before the department as required in the notice, the department shall revoke for
one year hi<? license or permit to drive. The department shall also assess against
the person, in addition to any fee imposed under subsection 41-2-8 (?)., a £t_e of $25,
which must be paid before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover
administrative costs, and which fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an
unappealed court decision following a proceeding allowed under this subsection that
the revocation was not proper. Any person whose license has been revoked by the
department under the provisions of this section shall have the right to file a petition within 30 days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in the district court
in the county in which stteh the perse- s ^ H fesitk resides, feeh The court is
hereby vested with jurisdiction, and it shall be its dtrty *e set the matter for trial
de novo upon 10-days' written notice to the department and thereupon to take testimony and examine into the facts of the case and to determine whether the
petitioner's license is subject to revocation under the provisions of this aet chapter.
(e) (3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition rendering
him incapable of refusal to submit to any such chemical test or tests shall be
deemed not to have withdrawn the consent provided for in subsection (a-) (1) of
this section, and the test or tests may be administered whether such person has
been arrested or not.
(4) (4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of such test
or tests shall be made available to him.
(e) (5) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or person authorized
under subsection 26-1-30 (19), acting at the request of a peace officer can withdraw
blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug content therein. This
limitation shall not apply to the taking of a urine or breath specimen. Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or person authorized under subsection
26-1-30 (19) who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws a sample of blood from

68

TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

41-6-44.30

any person whom a peace officer has reason to believe is driving in violation of
this chapter, or hospital or medical facility at which such sample is drawn, shall
be immune from any civil or criminal liability arising therefrom, provided such
test is administered according to standard medical practice.
£f) (6) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of
his own choosing administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests administered at the direction of a peace officer. The failure or inability to obtain such
additional test shall not affect admissability of the results of the test or tests taken
at the direction of a peace officer, nor preclude nor delay the test or tests to be
taken at the direction of a peace officer. Such additional test shall be subsequent
to the test or tests administered at the direction of a peace officer.
(g) (7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test
or tests, the person to be tested shall not have the right to consult an attorney
nor shall such a person be permitted to have an attorney, physician or other person
present as a condition for the taking of any test.
W (8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests
under the provisions of this section, evidence of refusal shall be admissible in any
civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and any
drug.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.10, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 43; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 16.

occupants. Garcia v. Schwendiman (1982) 645
P 2d 651.

Actual physical control.
To establish actual physical control of a
vehicle for purposes of this section, it is
unnecessary to show actual intent to control
the vehicle; intent to control a vehicle may be
inferred from the performance of those acts
which constitute actual physical control.
Garcia v. Schwendiman (1982) 645 P 2d 651.
There was an adequate showing that
motorist was in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle where motorist occupied the
driver's position behind the steering wheel of
a motor vehicle with possession of the ignition key and with apparent ability to start
and move the vehicle; fact that vehicle was
blocked by a fence and another vehicle and
could be moved only a few feet did not preelude a finding of actual physical control.
Garcia v. Schwendiman (1982) 645 P 2d 651.
The "actual physical control" language of
this section should be read as intending to
prevent intoxicated drivers from entering
their vehicles except as passengers or passive

Proceeding to revoke license for failure to
submit to test.
Driver's license revocation proceeding for
failure to submit to a requested chemical test
requires proof only by a preponderance of
the evidence. Garcia v. Schwendiman (1982;
645 P 2d 651.
At a proceeding to revoke a driver's license
for failure to submit to a requested chemical
test, department of public safety has the buiden to show arrested person was driving or
in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
in addition to showing that the arresting
officer had grounds to believe that the
arrested person was under the influence; the
same evidentiary burden must be met in a
trial de novo in the district court. Garcia v.
Schwendiman (1982) 645 P 2d 651.
^aw Reviews.
Hansen v. Owens — Expansion of the Privilege against Self-incrimination to Unknown
Limits, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 447.

41-6-44.30. Seizure and impoundment of vehicles by category I peace officers. The legislature finds that it is contrary to the safety of the public to leave
vehicles unattended on public roads.
(1) If a category I peace officer arrests or cites the driver of a vehicle for violating sections 41-6-43, 41-6-44, 41-6-44.2, or 41-6-44.10, the officer shall seize and
-impound the vehicle.
(2) Any such officer who impounds a vehicle under this section shall remove,
or cause the vehicle to be removed, to the nearest accessible state impound yard
that meets the standards set by rule by the state department of motor vehicles,
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